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THE INFLUENCl:. OF THE URBAN INFORHAL SECTOR ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

Victor E. Tokman

1.

The Main Hypothesis
The shift of the labour force from agriculture to non-agricultural

sectors would affect the secular income structure, widening inequality
in the early phases of transition from pre-industrial to industrial
economies, becoming stabilized for a while and narrowing in the later
phases (Kuznets, 1955).

This behaviour is expected as the result of

both a greater degree of inequality and higher incomes per capita pre
vailing in the receiving sector.

According to Kuznets' estimates,

given the previous facts, inequality should increase until the weight
of non-agricultural sectors reaches 60-70 percent of the total labour
force.
The previous analysis implicitly assumes that labour movements
occur in a two-sector framework, while one of the main characteristics
of the process of growth of less developed countries seems to be the
existence of a significant and non-disappearing urban informal sector.
This would require changes in the analysis to allow for a more complex
intersectoral mobility, since most of the agricultural labour force
seems to enter into the urban economy through the informal sector
(PREALC, 1978).

Some of them stay for all their working life, while

the rest shift to more modern occupational positions.
The presence of an important urban informal sector affects the
present distribution of income and its evolution.

On the one hand,
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income distribut ion within the sector is expected to be more egalitaria n
than that prevailin g in urban modern activitie s.

This can be so as a

result of higher competiti on between units within the informal sector,
as well as the mechanism s of surplus distribut ion which prevail inside
the productiv e units.

One can, however, expect that these trends would

still imply a higher degree of inequality than in the agricultu ral sec
tor, but tne transitio n from pre-indu strial to industria l economies will
thus have smaller effects on inequalit y.

On the other hand, the evolu

tion of the employmen t structure in less developed countries is showing
that the share of the informal sector in the urban labour force is not
decreasin g and, as a consequen ce of rural-urba n migration s, its share in
the total labour force is increasin g (Tokman, 1979).

The employmen t

trends are combined with increasin g income different ials between the
modern and informal sectors.

As a result, although inequalit y during

the first phase can be smaller than that anticipat ed by Kuznets~ it
could indeed increase in the process of growth and postpone for a long
period the expected improveme nt in income distribut ion.
Some of these issues will be tackled in this paper.

For such a

task we will follow Stewart's (1978) methodolo gy trying to analyze the
system of payment prevailin g in the urban informal sector.

The rules

governing income determina tion within the sector will be discussed in
the following three sections.

The rules governing access to complemen tary

resources will be examined in the fifth section, while the rules govern
ing capital accumulat ion and organizat ion of productio n will be con
sidered in the sixth section.
analyze the implicati ons of

Finally, an attempt will be made to
the system of payment prevailin g in the

informal sector on the degree of inequality and its evolution .
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II.

Market share:

Nature and magnitudes

To analyze how incomes are determined in the informal sector 1 one
has to understand first, how the share of the sector in total income is
determined and second, what are the conditions of entry to the sector.
The former aspect is linked to the type of interrelatio nships which
prevail between the informal sector and the rest of the economy, while
the latter is related to the degree of heterogenei ty which can be found
within the sector.
The discussion about the kind of intersector al links which prevails
presents a diversity of approaches in the literature. 2

They vary from

assuming dependency and exploitatio n (Quijano , 1974; Bienefeld, 1975;
Gerry, 1974; Bose, 1974) to the assumption of the existence of benign
relationshi ps (ILO, 1972; Mazumdar, 1976; Sethuramian , 1975).

The former

approach sees the informal sector as the result of subordinatio n pre
vailing both at internation al and national levels.

Under this approach

the market for informal sector activities is subordinate d, residual and
without possibilitie s of expansion.

It is argued that,given the in

egalitarian internation al economic system, the possibili~i es of accumula
tion of less developed countries are restricted because
increases in productivity tend to be concentrated and retained in de
veloped countrieo,w hile the smaller increases registered in developing
countries are transferred by different mechanisms from terms of trade to
technologic al transfer and transnation al corporation s.

In turn, inter

nati:onal depeooQnce generates an heterogeneo us internal productive
structure due to the concentratio n of technologic al change in modern
activities and the limited capacity of diffusion derived from the low
income elasticity for wage goods of those who benefit from such process
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and the labour saving bias of the new technology.

This process gives

place to an informal sector which does not create surplus,or if it does,
its surplus is extracted by either labour exploitation derived from the
existence of a labour surplus or by unfavourable terms of trade.

In

both cases the market for the informal sector is seen as a subordinated
one, since the prices for the goods and services produced as well as
the size of the market are determined outside the sector without
possibilities of influencing it from the informal productive units.
Besides, as surplus is. not created, the size of the market for the
sector will continuously decrease.
The second approach assumes that informal activities are comple
mentary to those of the modern sectors and that they will benefit from
output expansion.

Complementarity is derived from the efficient use of

resources available, since it uses intensively labour which is abundant
and does not require too much capital or foreign exchange presenting
comparative advantages in relation to similar activities developed in
the modern sectors.

On

the other hand, the.informal activities play an

important role in different aspects of the economic process mostly in
the distribution of goods and services, in transportation of persons,
but mainly of couunodities and in the supply of credit.

This type of

interrelationsh iPswill imply that the market for the informal sector
will grow pari passu with the economy, while price determination will
depend on the organization of production.

As surplus can be created,

the informal sector under this approach can increase its size either by
autonomous growth·or by induced expansion of the overall economy.
Subordination at the international and national levels is the
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characteristic of underdevelopment and the informal sector analysis is
one way to look at a more comprehensive phenomenon.

The existence of

subordinated relationships would be accepted even by those who support
that complementarity relationships predominate.

The problem is to

determine how strong is the subordination and whether there is room
left for evolutionary growth.
Although a subordinated rel~tionship with the rest of the economy
will prevail for the informal sector as a whole, some degree of autonomy
is expected not only because it internally supplies its own demand for
most manufactured goods, but mainly because of the importance of informal
commercial activities and second-hand goods.

On

the other hand, the

subordination of the sector as a whole is the result of different pro
cesses occurring within it.

In this sense, those infOIT'l3l activities

which are presently operating in oligopoly markets should be dis
tinquished from those wr.ere that is not the case.

This division will

generally, though not always, coincide with the breakdown of informal
activities according to type of product (manufacturing goods, personal
services, and services connected with distribution and finance).
Markets and price determination for those informal activities al
ready operating under oligopoly conditions will be subordinated to the
decisions of the oligopoly firms.

The evolution of this type of market

passes through different phases where informal activities will expand
or contract depending on the rhythm of demand expansion, minimum scale
of operation for different size of establishments, economies of scale,
etc.

Given their position in the market, they cannot benefit from

short-term extraordinary profits and in the longer run they will tend
to lose markets.

This is the present or future case for most informal
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manufa cturing activit ies.

3

There are other inform al activi ties, mainly person al service s,
where large concen tration seems unlikel y in the medium run.
Techno logical change in these activit ies is more gradua l and their sub
sistenc e in econom ies of higher income levels allow to anticip ate their
expans ion.

However, income improve ments based on produc tivity changes

are not likely to occur.
An interm ediate case is that of inform al commerce activi ties.

Techno logical change within this activit y is also gradua l and concen tration
trends are slower.

In additio n the factors which determ ine the sur-

t
vival of inform al units under oligopo ly conditi ons are very much presen
in this case.

Market imperf ections , especi ally demand behavio ur at

low income levels, introdu ce a sort of produc t and geogra phical dif
ferenti ation which ensures the perman ence of these activit ies for longer
periods than, say, inform al manufa cturing activit ies.

Locatio n, owner

custom er person al relatio nships , credit, infinit e possib ilities of
produc t subdiv ision, perman ent presenc e because of inexist ence of
"busine ss hours" , etc., are factors which allow them to mainta in a
share in the overa11 market .

Indeed , many of these factors are linked

to insuffi cient purchas ing power and, in the long run, the introdu ction
of superm arkets will imply simila r conditi ons as the case of oligopo ly
market s.

They are, howeve r, entang led with cultura l pattern s which

make changes in consum ption pattern s more difficu lt,

as is well

illustr ated by the develop ment of these activit ies in econom ies with
higher levels of income .
To sum up, the differe nt type of interre lations hips that a group of
activit ies within the inform al sector has with the rest of the economy
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will determine its share in total income and its evolution.

Given the

previous analysis, only normal profits can be expected in most of the
informal activities, while a diminishing trend of the share of the
informal sector's output in the total can be envisaged in the long run. Such
a

trend could not be monotonous, and its rhythm is difficult to fore-

cast given the mechanism of resistance which exists.
In order to have an idea of the quantitative characteristics of
the informal sector and its interrelationships, it is necessary to
estimate the balance of payments position with the rest of the economy.
This we have done for Chile and Mexico around 1970 to illustrate the
methodology and type of results that can be expected. 4
The urban informal sector in both countries accounts for around
40 percent of the urban labour force or between 27 and 22 percent of
the total labour force. 5

Its share in urban value added varies between

20 and 13 percent and as a consequenc~ output per person employed in
the sector is .57 and .44 of total output per person and .44 and .33
of urban output per person.

That is, income differentials are, on the

average, around 1:2 in relation to the total economy and 1:3 in compari
son to the rest of the urban sector (see Table 1).

Manufacturing in

dustries in both cases account for 23 percent of informal sector em
ployment, while personal services and commerce activities generate
around 70 percent of total employment and 60 percent of the value added
by the sector.

It must be noted that the informal sector contributes

significantly to employment and output in most of the urban economic
activities, being particularly important in commerce where it accounts
for 57 percent of employment and 34 percent of value added in Chile and
58 percent of employment and 22 percent of value added in Mexico.

In
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Table 1.

Employment and Value Added by the Informal Sector in Chile and Mexico,
circa 1970 (Percenta ges)

Mexico

Chile
Employment

a

Valueb
Added

Employment

a

Valueb
Added

Food, beverages and tobacco

21.2

6.2

35.7

6.4

Textiles, shoes, clothing and leather

47.8

20.4

43.4

7.8

Wood, cork and furniture

44.4

19.2

51.5

20.5

Non metallic minerals

15.7

2.0

46.0

9.6

Metallic products, machinery and
transport

28.0

14.0

27.7

8.4

Other industrie s

37.9

20.4

26.3

7.0

(32.3)

(12.0)

(37.2)

(8.5)

Construct ion

29.4

17.6

30.9

10.4

Personal services

44.9

24.8

42.5

10.4

Commerce

57.3

34.4

58.5

25.6

Transport

20.0

11.2

28.7

17.3

as percentag e of urban total

39.9

19.7

39.3

12.8

as percentag e of total economy

27.5

15.7

21.8

9.5

Total manufactu ring industrie s

Total informal sector

Sources:

Chile (Tokman, 1978), Mexico, estimates on the basis of national statistic s.

aOn total employment of each sector.
bOn total value added of each sector.
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manufacturing industries its share in employment varies between 32 and 37
percent and it generates between 12 and 9 percent of the output of the
sector.
The informal sector should be seen neither as a completely integrated
nor as an autonomous sector, but rather as one with significant links with
the rest of the economy while simultaneously it also presents a consider
able degree of self-containment.

Exports of the informal sector as

percentage of total goods and services available for the sector amount
to 45 and 58 percent, while imports constitute between 36 and 61 percent.
Exports from the sector are mostly constituted by personal services,
but in addition between 50 and 60 percent of consumer goods produced by
the informal sector are sol~ to the rest of the economy.

The main im

ports are raw fooestuffs from the agricultural sector and processed
foods and inputs from the urban formal sector.

The degree of dependence

of consumption on imports is higher than that registered for inputs.
The balance of payments position in the case of Chile registers a
surplus in current account which amounts to 20 percent of the informal
sector exports, while the opposite occurs in Mexico where a deficit of
6 percent of exports is estimated.

In the former case the informal

sector is transferring resources to the rest of the economy, while in
the latter it is a net receiver, although in an insignificant quantity.
The sectoral

disaggregation of the balance of payments shows a similar

pattern for both countriesr

a deficit with the agricultural sector and

a surplus with the rest of the urban activities.

The informal sector is

then playing an intermediary role in the resource transfer from the
agricultural to the urban modern sectors (see Table 2).
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Table 2.

Balance of Payments of the Informal Sector in Chile and Mexico,
circa 1970

'Chile
percentmillion of
ages
escudos
1.

With the formal sector
2581

100.0

27.153

100.0

Intermediate goods

615

23.8

7.694

28.3

Gonsumption goods

1878

72.8

18.630

68.6

88

3.4

829

3.1

1795

100.0

21.853

100.0

344

19.2

8.566

39.2

1451

80.8

13.287

60.8

786

30.5a

5.300

18.3a

Exports

Capital goods
Imports
Inputs
Consumption goods
Surplus
2.

With the agricultural sector
457

100.0

1.830

100.0

Intermediate goods

339

74.3

850

46.4

Consumption goods

118

25.7

980

53.6

642

100.0

8.828

100.0

93

14.5

1.693

19.2

549

85.5

7.135

80.8

-185

-40.6a

-6.998

-24.2a

28.983

58.lb

35.9

-30.682

61.5b

19.8a

-1.699

-5.9a

Exports

Imports
Raw materials
Consumption goods
Deficit
3.

Total balance of payments
Exports

3038

Imports

-2437

Balance

601

Sources:
a

As

Mexico
percentmillion of
ages
pesos

Mexico, estimates on the basis of national

Chile (Tokman, 1978).
sta ti.sties.

percentage of exports.

44. 7b .

b

percentage of available goods and services
(production plus imports minus exports).

As

t
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Given the depend ence of the inform al sector a declin ing trend
in
its terms of trade should be expect ed.

Althou gh it is clear that both

prices and marke ts are determ ined outsid e the sector , its balanc
e of
payme nts is divers ified and consid erably diverg e from the situat
ion
confro nted in the intern ationa l depend ence analys is.

An exami nation

of income elasti cities of export s and import s show that in Chile
and
Mexico the elasti city for export s is twice that regist ered
for impor ts.
This is partly the result of regist ering a struct ure of trade
flows
which differ s f~om that of the countr y as a whole, since low
income
elasti city items like agricu ltural produc ts and raw mater ials
are im
ports for the sector and partly becaus e of the high elasti city
which
chara cteriz e the demand for domes tic servic es. 6

The latter elasti city

which sugge st a large market for this kind of inform al activi
ties will
not neces sarily imply higher income s given the existe nce of
surplu s labour .
On the other hand, basic servic es (water , electr icity, etc.)
which also
const itute a signif icant import of the sector are subjec t to
public
tariff polici es which often involv e a subsid y compo nent.

Weigh ts,

elasti cities and prices of these balanc e of payme nts compo nents
will
vary accord ing to count ries,b ut in the case of Chile the terms
of trade
(ratio of export to impor tprice s) of the inform al sector show
an improv e
ment of 12 percen t during the 1960-7 0 period , while in the
case of
Mexico they improv ed by 4 percen t betwee n 1968 and 1977.

-12-

III.

Market Structure and Income Determination
From the analysis made above three main subgroups of informal

activities can be distinguished.

The first operates in the base of a

concentrated market where cost differentials due to economies of scale
are significant.

A second subgroup operates under monopolistic competition

where product differentiation and location are important but operative
costs are similar.

The third subgroup is constituted by those activities

which are inserted in a perfec_t competitive market.

Examples of activ

ities belonging to the first subgroup are manufacturing industries which ,
on the average, concentrate around 19 percent of the informal sector
employment in Latin America.

Retail commerce, repair shops and semi

skilled services are within the second subgroup amounting to around 30
percent of the informal sector employment, while the rest of the activ
ities,mostly constituted by services,confront competitive markets.

7

The three market structures share one common feature, that is, the
equilibrium in the long run is reached at a point in which no supernormal
profits are possible and only those profits which are just sufficient to
This

induce the entrepreneur to stay in the industry can be generated.

is the case when oligopoly firms in concentrated markets fix prices at
the minimum cost level of the small firms operating in the base of the
market, since at this point it ensures maximum profits.
firm

has

The oligopoly

differential advantages over its competitors but it also

confronts diseconomies to scale due to product differentiation and
imperfection in factor markets which constrains its expansion.

Hence,

the oligopoly firms are unable to extend its output indefinitely at
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minimal costs and encounters progressively rising costs beyond an
optimal scale.

The adjustment of the market in the long run will be

reached at a price level which exceeds the minimal average cost of the
oligopoly firm ensuring supernormal profits for it, and in general it
will not exceed the minimal average cost of competitive (informal)
firms, thus allowing only for normal profits for these firms.
A similar situation is confronted by those informal activities
inserted in monopolistic competitive markets.

In these cases, products

are generally differentiated by the conditions surrounding their sale
including the convenience of each seller's location.

Buyers are then

given a basis for preference and will therefore be paired with seller,
not in a random fashion but according to their preferences.

Each

seller, however, is subject to the competition of other products sold
under different circumstances and in different locations.

There is not

a single large market of many sellers, but a network of related markets,
one

for each seller (Chamberlain, 1948).

Each seller confronts a

negatively sloped demand curve for his distinct product,but his output
constitutes such a small part of the total market that his decisions will
However, simultaneous movements on the part

not affect his competitors.

of all sellers cause shifts in demand.

The short run equilibrium for the

individual seller will be reached when costs equate revenue but the
competitive pressure given by the large number of firms restricts the
possibilities of obtaining supernormal profits and reduce them in the
long run to a normal level.

8

In the case of competition the normal profit equilibrium position
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is ensured by the characteristics of the market since each producer
confronts an infinite elastic demand and prices are given.

Any super

normal profits.will induce the expansion of existing firms or the
entrance of new units in the long run, reducing profits to their normal
level.

9

Implicitly or explicitly the long-run condition for zero profit
equilibrium is linked to easy entry.

This condition, as noted by

several authors (ILO, 1972; Tok.man, 1977) seems to be one of the main
characteristics of urban informal activities.

That urban informal

activities are characterized by easy entry has been questioned by other
authors (Bienefeld, 1975; Raczynski, 1977 and 1978; Moller, 1979)
arguing that barriers to entry exist for many informal activities.
Easy entry characteristics regarding their effects on
profits should be differentiated from the possibilities of entrance of the
population into informal activities.

For the former effects it will

suffice that there are a certain number of persons which fulfill the con
ditions of entry required to perform an activity, to ensure that com
petition is produced in such a market,and hence
will be obtained.

no supernormal profits

In the cases where a large number of units are

already established, as in the majority of informal activities, the
possibility of expansion of the established firms will produce similar
effects on profits and ensure the inexistence of barriers to entry.

It

will be sufficient that a number of persons can meet the requirements to
establish auto repair shops, for instance, to
profits in this activity.

eliminate

supernormal

The number of new entrants required will be
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associated vit~ the size of the mBrket.

This, of course, does not imply

that all members of the labor force can establish an auto repair shop.
The existence and importance of barriers to entry te the informal
sector should be assessed in relation to modern sector activities.

There

is no doubt that entrance to the informal sector is easier than to the
rest of the urban activities since most of the factors which determine
restrictions to entry cannot be found in the sector.

Such is the case

of advantages for the established firms derived from economies of scale
or absolute cost advantages due to control over superior production
techniques, imperfections in the market of productive factors, control
over strategic factor supplies,or preferential access to capital markets
(Bain, 1967).

If such factors are not present in the informal sector the

only cause for barriers to entry will be product differentiation.

Such

differentiation in the ~ase of modern firms is associated with sales pro
motion and advertising as well as with the design or·physical quality of
competing products, while in the case of the informal sector it
is limited to the offering of auxiliary services to buyers and to loca
tion.

This will then be

the only factor which could generate advantages

for the established firms constituting barriers to entry to the informal
sector.

Its height, however, does not seem to be high as it is well

illustrated by the rapid rate of turnover that
informal units devoted to retail

is usually found in

and repair activities.

10

Easy entry, from an economic viewpoint, does not mean equal access
opportunities for all surplus labour.

This will depend on the possibil

ities of obtaining complementary resources, mostly capital and skill,
as well as the capacity to surpass the product differentiation barrier,
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generally linked to producer- customer special relations hip5.

Let us

examine first the latter.
Product different iation is an important factor for establishe d
informal activitie s like commerce and repair and for services performed
by semi-skil led workers such as seamstres ses, plumbers and electricia ns.
The barrier generated by this factor can be in most cases explained by
differenc es in access to complemen tary resources .

This situation varies

according to occupatio ns, but generally the preferenc e of consumers to
rather
demand from one firm or person/th an another operates as a different iation
factor between sizes of firm rather than among similar units.

In those

personal services performed by semi-skil led persons the access to a
clientele of higher income can indeed raise their income possibili ties.
Lack of transpare nce in the market seems to be the main explanati on for
income different ials which cannot be explained by differenc es in capital
or skill endowmen ts.

Given the imperfect ion in market informati on,

informal networks of insertion tends to operate based on personal con
tacts and recommen dations.

However, the possibili ties of access to

thereinfor mal networksa re generally wide, although they are not homogeneous
for everybody .

Relatives , members of the extended family, and friends

play an important intermedi ary role in the insertion s to the market
(Lomnitz, 1978).
A different situation is confronte d by those who perform establish ed
informal activitie s.

Product different iation in this case is linked to

condition s surroundi ng the sale of the product, including location.

Such

condition s can be met by most of the members of the community provided
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that they have access to complementary resources.

Retail activity, for

instance, gives additional services to the customer such as longer bus
iness hours, product divisibility, credit, personal seller-customer re
lationship, closer location to residence.

Most of these factors are only

important when the demand comes from low purchasing power consumers,
while any new firm with similar characteristics can provide the additional
services required to compete for the customer preferences within a
neighbourhood.

Income differentials can be generated by the monopolistic

factors which operate between neighbourhoods of different acquisition
power.

Such differences will generally be due to rents, interest, and/or

costs of products due to quality differentials, and the barriers will be the
amount of capital required rather than "product" differentiation. 11
Skill requirements do not appear as important barriers to the en
trance to informal activities.

In general, they concentrate those per

sons with the lower levels of education.

In Asuncion (Paraguay) and San

Salvador (El Salvador), for instance, three out of four persons with less
than three years of education,and two out of three between four and six
years,are performing informal activities.

(PREALC, 1978).

Formal educa

tion, as well as skill, seem also to be distributed evenly by type of
activities.

Only

two (laundry and domestic services) of the twelve

informal occupations studied in the case of Chile show a concentration
of low level of formal education and low skill requirements, while the
rest of the activities register requirements mostly concentrated in the
intermediate skill levels (around 70 percent) with similar tails at
both extremes of the distribution (unskilled and highly skilled jobs).
In addition, the time required for on-the-job training is less than two
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years in 90 percent of the cases analyzed,and only in laundry activities
all the cases considered established a requirement of less than three
months of training (PREALC, 1979).

12

The examination of the differences in the skill required within the
four most important informal occupations in the same case (seamstresses,
plumbers, retailers and mechanics) clearly show that such differences
are not very large and can be made-up with experience on the job.

In

all of the four activities a person can start at the lower skill level
and move with the experience on the job to perform more skillful tasks
with the exception of the highly specialized functions in three of the
occupations.
.

Formal training and experience are substitutes in skill

13

That skills are generally acquired while working is dem14
.
onstrated in many cases studied , as well as by the small importance of

upgrad 1.ng.

formal training.

Of the cases studied in Chile only 17 percent has

received some formal training.

On-the-job training is accomplished

mainly by working as wage·worker or apprentice generally in small firms.

15

Capital availability introduces a differentiation in the returns
obtained by those persons working in the informal sector but it does not
seem to constitute a significant barrier to entry.

On the averag~ capital

requirements per productive units and capital labour ratios are substantially
lower than those registered for the same activities in the modern sector.
Around 95 percent of the informal activities studied in Chile required less
than US$3000 per unit, while 80 percent requires less than US$1000 per
unit.

There also seems to be some capital requirement divisibility since

around 60 percent of the units register levels below US$300 and almost a
16
The spread
third operates with insignificant capital (PREALC, 1979).
in capital requirements is not a result of the aggregation of different
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requirements by occupation but each of them presents such a pattern showing indeed differences in the floor and

ceilings.

Street sellers

and those established in open markets, laundry women and construction
workers seem to reach the top level at US$300; while most of the established
commerce, tailors and seamstresses, mechanics and electricians require a
minimum capital of US$30.

To be a taxi owner it would require a minimum

capital of around US$2000.
The process of capital accumulation and firm growth cycle can also
be observed through the case studies available.

They suggest that in

most cases the persons start with little capital and then accumulate dur
ing the operation of the firm.

This is clearly the case of auto repair

shops which generally start as backyard garages with only few tools
(PREALC, 1978 and 1979a)and for established retail services which also
show the same cycle of growth (PREALC, 1978a).

Of course, there are

cases which start with larger capital endowments but the general trend.
suggests that capital differentials are the result of the evolution of
the firms.

Low

capital barriers to entry seem then to prevail,

Although capital availability explainsincome differentials, the heter
ogeneity in the capital structure of the informal sector is generated by
factors affecting the possibilities of growth of the firms rather than by
different points of departure.

17

The process of growth seems to reach a

ceiling, which constitutes a barrier for the informal firm from becoming a
modern unit.

Minimum capital requirements to become

modern firms

constitute a jump in capital availability even for the most prosperous
informal units.

This can be illustrated by the situation confronted by

retailers or auto repair shops when they attempt to expand activities
beyond a certain level.

In both cases changes in the structure of the
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business are required since it usually involves a different product mix
as well as a different organization of production , the consequence is
a significant increase in capital requirements which cannot be financed
with own sources as in the case of informal activities.

IV.

18

Surplus Labour and the Dynamics of the Adjustment
Given the limited job opportunities generated by the modern sector,

the subordinated share of the informal activities in markets and the
relative easy entry in the sector, surplus labour will determine an
increase in informal employment until the income per person reaches
the opportunity cost of labour which will be close to the subsistence
level.

This is clearly the case for those informal activities per

formed with little or no capital and generally, by individuals.

The

situation, however, becomes more complex when,as seen in the previous
section, there exists the possibility of increasing capital in most of
the activities.

This growth process is often accompanied by the

creation of a small firm on quasi-capitalistic or family basis.

The

adjustment process will not be restricted to variations in labour
incomes but will also include returns on capital.

These returns on

capital will be generally lower than its opportunity cost and will be
entangled with the returns to labour which correspond

to the entre-

preneur.
The entrepreneur in small firms usually offer an indivisible
package composed of his own labour, that of his family, and some capi
tal.

Its objective is the maximization of total income.

Capital,

-21however, is partly non-transferable since it serves dual purposes

of being a household and a productive asset as

is the case with

shops installed in the household premises or transportation means which
serve

both purposes.

In addition, it usually does not involve a

cost since it is the result of past savings, sale of other domestic
. al trans f ers. 19
assets or f;ree capit

The alternative return for such

capital will not be the amount that can be obtained if invested in
the modern sector, since the minimum quantities required are greater
and only a fraction of such capital would be transferable.

This will

reduce the alternative return on capital to the rate of investment paid
on savings accounts by the banking system applied to a part of his
total capital.
Furthermore, in an economy with limited employment possibilities
in the modern sectors such capital ensures his own labour absorption
and that supplied by his family in the case of family firms, while it
allows the quasi-capitalistic entrepreneur to maximize his total income.
In the first case, the alternative would be to close the firm , invest
the part of the capital which is transferable and search for jobs for
himself and the rest of his family.

The rest of his family (mainly

the wife and school age children or old people in the family) are
not available for full time jobs since they share their work in the
shop with occupations outside the labour market (house care, school)
or with leisure.

This, added to the job scarcity in modern sectors,

implies that the alternative return to family labour will be limited
to the income that the head of the family can earn by working in that
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sector.

However , at this point his situatio n becomes similar to that

of the quasi-c apitalis tic entrepre neur since, given the barriers to
entry which prevail in the modern sector, his actual alternat ive will
be to become a dependen t in a modern establish ment of the same kind of
activity but where his entrepre neurial capacity will be mostly unused
and not remuner ated.

This implies that the income he is able to

perceive by working in his own informa l unit will exceed the alterna
tive capital and labour return and as a consequ ence,he will ee in a
stable position (i.e., not searchin g for jobs).
Given the imperfe ctions in factor markets and the downward pressure
on labour incomes produced by the existenc e of labour surplus ,it should
be expected that incomes earned in the informa l sector will be lower
than those which could be obtained in similar activiti es of the modern
sector if they were availab le.

This, in turn.wi ll imply the existenc e

of incentiv es to move from informal to formal jobs.

The distribu tion

of incomes of the informa l and formal sector will,how ever, present some
degree of overlapp ing which can be partly explaine d by differen ces in
persona l factors (educati on, age, experien ce, sex) and partly by
differen ces in capital availab ility.

While capital differen ces within

the informa l sector generate income differe ntials, they are expected to
be smaller than in the formal sector since there are no economie s of seal~
monopo listic profits do not exist, and

a more equal access to capital

is possible given its greater divisib ility and its limited return due
to imperfec t mobility .

These factors will ensure that

income dis

tributio n within the informa l sector is more egalitar ian than in modern
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sectors, being close to that prevailing for labour earnings in those
sectors.
The scarce data available support the previous analysis.

On the

one hand, although the distribu.tio n of income of the informal sectors
in the cases of Peru (Webb, 1974), Salvador, Dominican Republic and
Paraguay (Souza-Tokm an, 1978) overlaps with that of the formal sector,
the analysis made in the last three cases clearly show that such over
lapping

in most cases reflects persons with different characteris tics.

It also shows that there are cases which earn more than in the formal
sector and hence will not be induced to move out of their present
job, as

is the case with those who operate a successful retail shop. 20

This latter case has also been analyzed at a different level for
Santiago (Tokman, 197&1), showing that the small entrepreneu r is maximiz
ing his total income in the present occupation since his alternative
will imply a reduction in the return on capital, because of a lower
rate of interest and partial mobility and he will be forced to search
for a well paid job in a tied

labour market.

In the case of the family

firms, part-time jobs for the rest of the family labour force should
21
also be found.
In the cities analyzed (Asuncion, Santo Dimingo and San Salvador)
significant income differences were found between the informal and formal sectors, even in very homogeneous categorie~ such as persons with
the same level of education, age and sex or persons with similar sex,
education and occupationa l position.

For instance, males, in ages of

highest activity, with four to six years of education occupied in the
non-domesti c informal sector perceived around 60 percent of the income
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received by persons with identical characteristics employed in the
private formal sector.

Males, with four to six years of education,

employed in manufacturing informal establishments received 70 percent
of the income earned by similar persons working in the same type of
establishments but within the formal sector.

The same results are

reached using a two-stage multiple regression model which shows that
in Santo Domingo persons with identical personal characteristics

-:;:-e

ceived incomes 1.4 times larger if they are employed in the formal
rather than in the non-domestic informal sector, either in manufacturing
industry or in the other sectors.

Similar results are found for San

Salvador when all the sectors are considered.
manufacturing industry are larger (1.6 times).

The differences in
22

Income distribution for the informal sector as a whole is likely
to be more egalitarian than in the modern sector.

Although different

capital endowments create income differentials they are expected to be
smaller than in the rest of the economy.

This will give a degree of

income concentratim in the informal sector which could be slightly
greater but not too different than that prevailing for labour incomes
in the modern sector.

This is shown for Salvador (Dupre, 1979) and

Santiago (Uthoff, 1979) where the concentration of income in the
sector (defined as the variance of logarithm) is not significantly
different from that_ found in labour incomes. In the case of Colombia
the concentration of income in the informal sector is smaller than in
the modern sector, whatever the measure of concentration used (Gini,
23
Theil or log-variance, Bourguignon, 1978).
The same type of results can be seen by comparing incomes of self
employed with those of manual and non-manual workers as done for the
same case of Santiago {PREALC, 1979; Moller; 1979).

24

The distribution
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of income of the self employed in 1968 shows that while 47.3 percent
earned less than two minimum wages, only 10.5 received more than six
minimum wages.

The situation prevailin g for workers earnings shows

that 40.7 percent were in the first position, while 17.7 percent were
in the latter.

If a breakdown is made within the dependent workers,

it can be seen that the distribut ion of income is the result of two
different patterns prevailin g for blue collar and white collar workers
(see Table 3).
The average income of male self employed in Santiago in 1977 was
17 percent higher than that received by blue collar workers, while in
the case of female self employed, average incomes did not differ
significa ntly.

Income different ials by occupatio n in self employmen t

were 1:3, while that prevailin g for blue collar workers in different
sectors were 1:27.

Income different ials by skill level vary according

to occupatio n from 1.2 to 3 times and the same happens with different ials
by capital endowment fluctuatin g from 1 to 2.5 times.

This can be

compared with different ials found by Gregory (1967) of blue collar
incomes in the fifty largest industria l manufactu ring establishm ents
in Santiago which show smaller skill different iation (1.42 times ratio
of skilled to unskilled incomes) but larger wage different ials between
industrie s 4.51 and among unskilled labour in different subsector s, 3.
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Table 3.

Santiago: Distribution of Income by Occupation, 1968

White-Collar
Workers

Total
Workers

Self employed

Blue-Collar
Workers

Less than 1

20.6

16.7

2.0

9.0

Between 1-2

27.7

47.8

17.1

31.7

Between 2-5

41.2

33.9

48.6

41.6

Between 6-10

8.0

1.6

23.3

13.0

More than 10

2.5

9.0

4.7

100.0

100.0

Incomes in Minimum
Wages

100.0

Total

Source:

100.0
---

National survey of family incomes, March-June 1968, Direccion de
Estadisticas Y

Censos, Chile.

As cited by (Moller, 1979).
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V.

Public Policies and Access to Complementary Resources
The limited capacity of the informal activities to generate surplus

due to the rules affecting income determination in the sector could be
expanded by providing easier access to complementary resources through
public policies.

This, however, is not an easy task since it confronts

several constraints which are related

not only to the economic and

political power of those who make decisions but also to characteristics
of the informal units and of the persons working in them.

To illustrate

the type of problems which are confronted, it is worth looking at credit
and training programmes which, if effectively implemented, could allevi
ate the access to capital and skills.
Informal units usually tend to be excluded from credit, both private
and public.

As a consequence, their possibilities of financing are

r~stricted to their own savings, informal transfers or parallel capital
markets with a cost of capital which greatly exceeds that prevailing in
the rest of the economy.

Examples of this higher cost are shown for

microindustries in Mexico which paid rates eight times those paid by
larger industries (PREALC, 1979b)or the rates paid by street sellers in·
Salvador to those who finance their daily

working capital at 10 per

cent (PREALC, 1978).

The allocation of credit, usually involving a

subsidy,is determined

by several factors linked to the process of

delivery which are biased against small informal units.

The main

criteria for credit worthiness is the ownership of assets to guarantee
debt repayment and hence the unequal starting point tends to be per
petuated.

In addition, fixed administrative costs discriminate against
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operations for small amounts but in the above mentioned case of Mexico
they only explain 30 percent of the rate charged by the formal system,
the remainder being attributed to risk premium, and the monopsonist ic
position of the lender.

The low level of education and particularl y

of commercial training of the informal entrepreneu r is also a dis
advantage in view

of the complex paperwork involved in each credit

application .
Training programs for skill upgrading can also contribute to the raising of
productivit y of the informal sector.

These programs, however, tend

also to exclude persons working in the sector, being biased in favour of
the children of blue collar workers of large establishme nts as it has
been shown for Colombia and Chile (Puryear, 1977; PREALC, 1978).

This

bias is the result of the programs' definition and the characteris tics
of informal units and of the persons involved in such activities.

The

programs are usually conceived to provide skills for an industrial labour
force which would be employed in the modern sectors and as such, the main
task to be filled is the knowledge of new and increasingly capital
intensive technology.

This type of curricula becomes irrelevant for those

who are working with traditional technology and who do not envisage the
possibility of moving towards higher productivity occupations .

The

main obstacle is, however, what kind of content is relevant for units,
characterize d by atomization

, rudimentary division of labour which

implies few possibilitie s for occupationa l mobility within the unit,
and job

instability .

Personal characteris tics add more difficultie s to

this task, since the level of education of these people is low and
their capacity to pay for training is practically non-existen t.

In the
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case of Chile (PREALC, 1978), for example, it was estimated that direct
costs of training would absorb between 10 and 20 percent of the average
income of the informal sector.

If transport costs were included, the

proportion increased to half the average-income.
Indeed, the factors mentioned above can be solved by introducing
special measures in the policy packages.

The added complexity, however,

seems to favour inertia and public policy generally perpetuates the
outcome determined by the primary characteristics of insertion of units
and persons to the economic structure.

VI.

Intersectoral shiftings and Urban Income Inequality
The differences in income distribution within each segment of the

urban economy will affect the degree of inequality generated as the
result of the rural-urban shift in the labor force.
in the lower income but more egalitarian distributed
will diminish the increase in inequality.

The migrants insertion
informal sector,

If employment in the informal

sector is only a temporary phenomenon linked to the short-run constraint
faced by the modern sectors to create employment at the required rate,
once the urban labour market is adjusted, income distribution will follow
the U-shaped path.

The available empirical evidence suggests, however,

that the presence of the informal sector constitutes one of the structural
characteristics of less developed countries.
The theory explaining why the informal sector persists in spite of
the high rate of economic growth registered by most of the Latin American
countries has been largely debated in the literature and

falls beyond
/

\
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the scope of this paper.

25

It will suffice, however, tQ_ remark that

such behaviour is associated with the type of growth followed by these
countries which among other characteristics reflects
internal technological diffusion.
logical diffusion caused

a restricted

This process of restricted techno-

by the concentration in the distribution of

incomes prevailing in most of the countries and by factors associated
with imported technology, generates a concentration of modern, highly
capital intensive technology in subsectors and even in establishments
within sectors (mostly large), while the rest of the economy continues
operating with traditional technologies.

This process is also associated

with higher returns to factors of production in the modern sector, in
part, derived from productivity differentials but also as a result of
imperfections in factor markets.

The outcome is that the initial

concentration of income tends to perpetuate.
The process occurs in a context where modern establishments do not
face

strong comJetition, neither from the outside, because of high

tariff protection,

or from the rest of the firms, because of great

market concentration.

They then

do not pass the gains in productivity

through price reductions but rather factor incomes are higher.

In

addition, and not totally independent from the increase in factor incomes,
capital intensity tends

to increase and employment creation in the

modern sector becomes insufficient to absorb the rapidly growing labour
supply.

26

The payment of higher wages in the modern sector in economies
with relative labour surplus has been explained by several theories
ranging from the human capital differen~s to imperfections in labour
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markets due to trade union or government interferences.

The main reason,

however, seems to be in the partial monopoly conditions under which
modern firms operate which

allows them to pay due to the existence

of monopolistic profits while price instability in such markets would
generate heavy losses.

This is combined with other factors, such as

the need to stabilize the labour force, the political need of controll
ing the labour force and the international mobility of hierarchical
personnel (Tokman, 1978).
The fragmentary data available for several Latin American countries
support the previous analysis suggesting that the size of the informal
sector has not decreased in the process of growth.

This trend· has

been accompanied by a non-diminishing, and even in several cases,
increasing income and productivity differentials between the informal
and the modern sectors and by an increase in the wage dispersion in
the latter.
The share of self employed and unpaid family workers in the total
labour force of Latin America has increased from 9.6 percent in 1950
to 11.7 percent in 1970.

The share of urban self employed and unpaid

family workers in the urban labour force remained constant around 20
percent between the same years (Tokman, 1979).

A£ these are the main

components of informal sector employment, it suggests that the latter
has not been decreasing.

The census data on employment is confirmed

by the few case studies which estimate the evolution of employment and
output of the informal sector.

Webb (1974) reports that in Peru the

traditional sector share on the labour force increases from 24.1 to
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33.1 percent between 1950 and 1970, while its share on value added
decreases from 35.1 to 34.6 during the same period.

Differentials

in productivity per person between sectors increased from 3.6 to
times.

Nelson et

al. (1971) also show a similar trend

4.4

for Colombia.

The share of the traditional sector on the labour force increases from
54 to 58 percent,while the income share diminishes from 45 to 34 per
cent between 1951 and 1964.
during the same period.
Santiago

Productivity differentials almost double

Moller (1979) finds that self-employment in

grew by 21 percent between 1967 and 1977, while their income

was reduced by 5 percent; in comparison wage earners increased their employment
by 9 percent and their income grew by 2 percent.
The data available on wage evolution seems also to support the
previous findings of increased intersectoral differentials,but they also
suggest that average dispersion within the modern sectors has also
increased.

In nine of the twelve Latin American countries which have

information, the ratio of minimum urban wages to average manufactuirng
wages decreased between 1966 and 1977.

In some of them, like Chile,

Costa Rica and Brazil, the reduction in the coefficient is acound 40
percent.

Only in one of the remaining countries (El Salvador), there

is an increase in the ratio (Tokman, 1979).

Several case studies show

the same results at a more disaggregate level.

The Webb study of Peru

recorded during the 1950-66 period an increase of income in the modern
sector at an annual rate of almost twice that found for the urban traditional sector (4.1 and 2.1 percent).

The rates of growth by occupa

tions suggest a greater dispersion since self employed, non-manual
employees in the traditional sector and domestic servants increased by
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wage earner s
1.6-1. 9 percen t while govern ment emplo yees, white collar and
in the modern sector increa sed by 3.3-4. 9 percen t per year.

Nelson also

1951-6 4
report ed for Colom bia an increa sed wage disper sion during the
their
period since the lowest 50 percen t of urban wage earner s raised
by 2-3 per
annua l real wage by 0-0.5 percen t, the follow ing 15 percen t
by 5 percen t
cent and the top 35 percen t, mostly worke rs in modern firms
per annum.
The eviden ce availa ble for Brazil also confir nsthes e trends .
Income differ ential s by occup ations and by skills increa sed.

The ratio

other nonbetwee n income s of admin istrati ve and techni cal employ ees to
agricu ltural worke rs rose

from 2.49 in 1960 to 2.86 in 1976.

Income s

1976,
of unski lled worker s decrea sed by 42 percen t betwee n 1961 and
ers
while those of skille d worker s increa sed by 8 percen t and manag
remun eration

rose

by 22 percen t.

Lango ni (1973) shows that the

income s of
averag e income of those with no school remain ; stagna nt; the
and 1970.
those with colleg e level increa sed by 52 percen t betwee n 1960
income
A revisi on made by Pfeffe rman and Webb still shows a rate of
.
growth for the former group of one-fo urth that of the latter

Wells

estab lish
(1974) calcul ates Gini coeffi cients on earnin gs report ed by
n 1959
ments showin g an increa se of 25 percen t in the coeffi cient betwee
and 1971.

This is the result of losses in the bottom decile s, togeth er

with signif icant gains in the top two decile s.
Bacha and Taylor (1978) also report

increa sed wage differ ential s

within manuf acturin g indust ry in Brazi l,

Techn icians and hierar chical

percen t
person nel increa sed their income s betwee n 1966 and 1972 by 7.2
income by
per annum, while unskil led indus trial worke rs reduce d their
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1.3 percent per annum and skilled and semi-skilled increased by 2.9
percent per year.

Other studies for the manufactur:fng sector in Chile

(Gregory, 1967) and Mexico (PREALC, 1976) show similar trends.

VII.

Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper seems to confirm Stewart's (1978)

hypothesis that the payment system given by the institutional framework
under which the informal sector operates determinESthe distribution of
primary claims over resources.

Such a payment system results in greater
capital-

equity and lower income levels than could be achieved in a
istic framework.

It is also clear that technology and population growth

play an important role in generating and perpetuating inequality.
That the payment system prevailing in the informal sector produces
such outcomes can be seen by exploring the rules which determine income
and its distribution within the sector.

Informal sector activities are

restricted in most cases to residual markets in which possibilities of
expansion are limited.

This, however, is not a

homogeneous feature

for all kinds of informal activities, but rather the result of different
trends which generate such results.

The balance of payments analysis

for Chile and Mexico ruled out the treatment of the sector as an isolated
parallel economy while also confirming that predictions about the future
share of the sector are difficult to make given the many factors in
volved in its determination.
The type of insertion of informal activities in the market structure
excludes the possibility of obtaining supernormal profits.

Relative ease
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of entry is also a common feature of most of the informal activities.
Given the size of the markets in which they operate, such easy entry
is at least sufficient to ensure competition among activities and to
rule out monopolistic profits.

It goes beyond the economic condition,

to ensure that most of the members of the labour force will find it easier
to comply with the requirements presented by the informal activities
than to surpass the barriers to entry which characterize modern opera
tions.

Absence of scale economies, low capital requirements and

divisibility contribute to widen the possibilities of entrance to the
sector.
The above ensures competition in the determination of factor re
turns, the differences mostly explained by different access to comple
mentary factors, mostly capital.

Imperfections in factor markets

together with the organization of production, mainly on family basis,
will, on the one hand, lower the alternative return to capital and on the
other ensure a distribution of total income according to needs rather
than to the marginal productivity of the family members.

This organization

of production characterized by atomization, little division of labour and
instability constitute,an important constraint in the implementation of
public policies addressed to facilitate access to complementary resources.
The set of rules which govern the functioning of the informal sector
will result in a more equitable distribution of income within the sector
than that prevailing in the rest of urban activities.

The technological

process characterized by restricted diffusion in a context of rapidly
growing urban labour supply interactswith the prevailing payments system
to determine a worsening in income distribution.

The main characteristics
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of this process are a non-decreasing share of the informal sector in
total employment and non-narrowing productivity differentials both
between the informal and formal sectors and within the latter.
The trends remarked in this paper seem

also to suggest that

changes in income distribution in the Latin American countries would
follow a different pattern than that anticipated by the U-shaped curve.
Rural to urban migration will generate less inequality than anticipated
because of the entrance of the newcomers to the city through the informal
sector.

The permanence of the sector as well as the maintenance and

even widening of productivity differentials, as suggested by the data, will
continue

to

than expected.

worsen

distribution of income for a longer period

This in a way is confirmed by Bacha (1977) who analyzed

changes in income distribution for thirty countries during the sixties.
He reaches the conclusion that the data suggest

an outward movement of

the Kuznets curve, while the turning point for the poorer 40 percent is
. 27
recorded at $900 instead of the $468 found by Ahluwalia ( 1976).
The analysis also suggests that increased concentration in the dis
tribution of income will be the result of larger shares of managers,
technicians, white collar and skilled blue collar workers, while those
at the bottom will not be able to expand their share of total incomes.
Indeed, within the lower income population, those who are
from rural to urban areas will also benefit.

able to migrate

This kind of picture seems

to emerge from the data on distribution of income for Latin America
(ECLA, 1977).

The lower 50 percent of the population maintain their

share at around 13.5 percent between 1960 and 1970, while those in the
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eighth and ninth deciles increased their share from 24.6 to 28.0 during
the period.

This twenty percent of the population was able to capture

40 percent of the total income increase and the top decile, although losing
share, retained 30 percent of such increment.

The remainder was dis

tributed between the lower 70 percent of the population resulting in an
absolute average income increase of the poorer 50 percent of $30 (dollars
of 1960) while the top 5 percent increased their income by $300.
was, however, a redistribution within the poor.

There

Those who were in the

lowest two deciles decreased their share and only gained $2 during the
period, while those in the third, fourth and fifth deciles, mostly migrants,
were able to increase their share from 10.3 to 11.4 percent and their
average income was in 1970 $50 higher than in 1960.
To conclude, one is tempted to recall the three questions posed by
Kuznets (1955).

The first question was: Is the pattern of the older

developed countries likely to be repeated in the sense that in early
p~§es- of industrialization in the underdeveloped countries income
will tend to widen before the leveling forces become strong enough first
to stabilize and then reduce income inequalities?

The second follows

from an affirmative answer to the first: Can the political framework
of the underdeveloped societies withstand the. strain which further widen
ing of income inequality is likely to generate?

Finally, he raised the

next question: How can either the institutional and political framework
of the underdeveloped societies or the process of economic growth and
industrialization be modified to favor a sustained rise to higher lev.!ls
of economic performance and yet avoid the fatally simple remedy of an
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authoritarian regime that would use the population as cannon-fodder
in the fight for economic achievement?
This paper is addressed to the first question.

Not only did

inequality tend to widen but the improvement is taking longer to arrive.
Unfortunately, the armed forces in most Latin American countries,
especially those of the Southern Cone, have answered the second question,
The many existing proposals developed by academics and international organizations sleep in an abandoned drawer,while the search for
economic

growth

is being experimented at the high cost of sacrificing

large masses of the population.

Footnotes

1we will not discuss here here the different definitions of the informal sec
For a detailed discussion of this subject see Tok.man (1977).

tor.
2

We have discussed this issue in detail elsewhere (Tok.man, 1978).

3Th"
. i es
inf orma 1 act i vit
h
d oes not necessar ily i mp 1y tat
.
is argument
operating under this condition will disappear, nor that they will do it
in a fixed period of time.

On the contrary, there are several factors

which could produce a less pronounced trend or even a reverse one.
These factors are mainly related to the constraints of expansion of the
oligopolistic firms and to the existence of imperfect competition in
product and, mainly, in factor markets (see Tok.man, 1978).
4

For the purpose of this paper only the main results will be dis-

cussed.

A more detailed discussion for the case of Chile can be found

in Tok.man, 1978.

Indeed, the source of data as well as the assumptions

that had to be included makes this exercise more a methodological rather
than an empirical one.
5

For the sake of simplicity when two figures are given and no

mention of countries is made; the first referes to Chile and the second to
Mexico.
6

rf

domestic services are excluded the elasticity of exports of

the informal sector in Chile is 36 percent higher than the elasticity
of imports, while in the case of Mexico it is 60 percent.

7

.

· One could argue following Chamberlain (19~8) that all activities
are inserted in markets under monopolistic competition, where factors
influencing perfect competition are variable.

This breakdown tends,

however, to remark those characteristics which are closely associated
to each market organization.
8

It is possible, especially in spatial differentiation, that mon-

opoly profits exist.

Differentials in the rent of urban land will tend

to absorb the whole or a large part of the monopoly profit due to this
factor (see Chamberlain, 1948; especially Appendices C and D).
9

When entrepreneurs are heterogeneous even if all other factors

are homogeneous, some firms will be able to earn supernormal profits
in the long run.

The only way in which these firms will be forced to

earn normal profits is by the entrance of entrepreneurs as efficient
as those already established with differential advantages.
lOThis is so even in countries with more stable and higher income
markets.

In the U.S., for instance, 80 percent of all replacement jobs

created between 1969 and 1976 were generated by establishments four years
old or younger while two-thirds of the net jobs created during that period
were generated by firms with 20 or fewer employees and five out of 6.7
million new jobs were in trade or service while manufacturers produced
virtually more.

(As reported by D. L. Birch, MIT, New York Times,

December 3, 1979.)

In the case of Santiago, Chile preliminary work for

a survey undertaken by Preal in 1976 show that no less than 50 percent of small
retail shops were replaced in less than two years.

11
Prices should not be the same in all neighborhoods unless the
distribution of buyers is a random one, neither will be the sales volume.
Each firm will tend to maximize returns over costs.

These costs in-

elude normal profits and the differential remaining, which is due to the
superiority of the profit-making opportunities afforded by one site as
compared to another, is rent, and is put into the hands of the landlords
by the competition of entrepreneurs for the best opportunities (Chamber
lain, 1948; Appendix D).

12

The survey covered self employment in the twelve most important

occupationsi

established commerce, street sellers, laundry women, ser

vice workers, taxi drivers, seamstresses and tailors, shoemakers, mechan
ics, electricians, plumbers, construction workers and others.

Two

questions made to those interviewed inquire the level of skill required
by their job.

The first one refers to whether the person interviewed
an
considered himself as/apprentice, unskilled,semi -skilled, skilled or

highly skilled.

He was then asked how long would it take to convert

an m1skilled worker in his activity into a skilled one.

13 In commerce
activities little skill differentials were found.
In the other three cases analyzed, of the four levels of skill established
within each activity, the movement from the third to the second level
could be shortened in time if learning by doing is substituted by formal
training.

The passage from the second to the top category would require

in most cases formal training.
14

This is shown, for instance, for household and small shops working

under subcontract in the clothing industry (Schmukler, 1979) and for

mechanics (Nun, 1978) in Argentina; for repair mechanic shops (PREALC,
1979) and for the self-employment activities (PREALC, 1979) analyzed in
Chile.
15

rn the self-employment activities in Chile, 80 percent of those
acquired skills while working in establishments

who declared

did

so in small enterprises while the remaining worked in modern sector firms.
The pattern seems to be somewhat different in the case of mechanics which
became owners of their shops since the skill requirements are higher.
They still learn with experience but a significant proportion acquired
such experience while working in large firms (PREALC, 1979).
16 capital in this study did not include land and buildings.
17All the small auto repair shops analyzed in Santiago (PREALC, 1979a)
started with little capital in their houses or that of some relatives and with
only a few tools.

All of them had expanded in comparison to the starting

size, some even have to reduce their over-expansion.

The capacity to

growth seems to be related more to the entrepreneurial capacity, skill
and in some cases, consumption propensities than to the initial capital
endowment.

The same seems to happen in retail service, where different

business cycle can be deduced according to whether the entrepreneur is
devoted full time and has experience in the trade.

Initial capital

indeed help to accumulate, but growth is not restricted to those cases
only as it is shown by the fact that while 7.5 percent of those shops
with larger capital and selling to higher income markets increased the
size of the establishment, 35.4 percent of the low capital-low income
markets did the same in Santiago (PREALC, 1978).

18
When mechanics were asked what would be their next step to expand

their establishments their answers reflected the introduction of changes in
the product mix (i.e., import of spare parts, auto trade, body repair).
The same happens when they were asked whether they could become

authorized

agents for servicing a car brand or by establishing long-term arrangements
for servicing large company cars.

The main constraint mentioned was the

minimum capital required mostly in tools and spare parts.

The answers

were consistent with differences in initial capital endowment observed in
the case studies.

The only modern garage analyzed started with an initial

capital of US$60.000 (PREALC, 1979a) with a product mix which included
servicing, sales and inputs of spare parts.

A similar situation is found

for the retailers which to surpass the informal sector boundary have to
become self services.

That kind of operation requires larger sales volume,

bigger buildings and broader product diversification.

All these factors

imply greater capital requirements (PREALC, 1978a).

19

Private fixed capital costs will be then negligible.

This explains

why in many cases small firms operate with zero return to capital which,
in turn, is one of the causes of the large turnover of establishments found
in these activities.
20

The exceptions of higher incomes in the informal sector are con-

centrated in middle aged and higher education groups devoted to established
commerce

activities.

In Asuncion, for instance, the income of the owner

of an establishment in the informal sector earned 46 percent more than
persons with similar education working in formal commerce activities.
If the comparison is made only with white collars in such activities,
incomes of the informal sector are 18 percent smaller than those perceived
in the formal sector.

The same type of results is found in San Salvador

and Santo Domingo (SouZ:i-Tokman 1978).

2

1rhe estimated income of the informal retailer for Santiago was

3.3 times the prevailing minimum wage.

If allowances are made for

unpaid family labour the net income of the owner would be 2.3 times
the minimum wage which unfavorably compares with the wage perceived by
white collar workers in supermarkets (3.2 times the minimum) (Tokman,
1978).
22

similar results are found for Belo Horizente, Brasil (Merrich,

1976) and for Colombia by Kugler (1977).
23

These estimates tend to overestimate the concentration prevail-

ing in the informal sector, since the higher income usually includes
the work of unpaid family workers.

There are other sources of bias, as

shown by Bourguignon, who increased the explanation power of the modern
traditional dishotomy on income differential, as measured by Theil's
coefficient from 7.7 percent to 12.5 percent if unemployed individuals are
included or to 12 percent, if the underestimation of incomes usually found
in the top deciles is corrected.
24

The comparison is a proxy to that of the informal-formal one.

It includes, however, workers in all types of establishments while
according to the usual definition of the informal sector, workers in
establishments with less than five employees should be included in it.
As they tend to receive lower wages, their effect will be a downward
bias in the average wage and in the distribution of wages.

25

26

See, for instance, Pinto (1965), Prebisch (1978) and PREALC (1978b).

Nelson, et. al. (1971) presents a formal model of restricted

technological diffusion.
27

This is the result shown by the regression equation between the

ratio of changes in the share of the lower 40 percent to the rate of
growth of GNP and the logarithm of GNP per person in the middle of the 60's.
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